Office of Governor: Issues (Concerns) and Suggestions

The Governor is the constitutional head of a State and performs functions broadly similar to those of the President at the Union level. Though ordinarily required to act on the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers, the Constitution grants the Governor limited discretionary powers to protect constitutional governance. However, controversies over assent to State Bills, government formation, floor tests, university administration and politically partisan conduct have made the office a recurring source of Centre–State friction.

Recent Controversies Associated with the Office of Governor

Delay in Assent to State Bills: Several State governments have accused Governors of keeping Bills pending for prolonged periods, effectively creating a form of “pocket veto”, even though this expression is not mentioned in the Constitution.

Tamil Nadu: In April 2025, the Supreme Court criticised the Tamil Nadu Governor for prolonged inaction on university-related Bills and treated certain repassed Bills as deemed to have received assent.

o However, in its November 20, 2025 advisory opinion on the Presidential Reference, a five-judge Bench clarified that courts cannot prescribe fixed timelines where the Constitution provides none and that the Constitution does not recognise the concept of “deemed assent.”

Punjab: The Punjab government approached the Supreme Court after the Governor delayed summoning the Assembly and acting on Bills. The controversy raised questions about whether the Governor could question the validity of an Assembly session instead of acting on the advice of the elected government.

Chhattisgarh: The Chhattisgarh Reservation Amendment Bills, 2022, proposing 76% reservation, remained pending as the Governor sought clarification on quantifiable data and constitutional limits on reservation. Several Bills relating to universities, cooperative societies and agricultural markets also witnessed prolonged delays.

o Constitutional concern: Prolonged inaction under Article 200 can frustrate the legislative will of an elected Assembly and disturb the principle of responsible government.

Conflict over Appointment of Vice-Chancellors: Governors serve as Chancellors of State universities under various State university laws, not by virtue of an express constitutional provision.

Conflicts have arisen in Tamil Nadu, Kerala, West Bengal and Punjab over:

• Appointment and removal of Vice-Chancellors.
• Constitution of university search committees.
• Representation of the State government in selection panels.
• Alleged non-compliance with UGC Regulations.
• State Bills seeking to replace the Governor with the Chief Minister or another authority as Chancellor.

Governor’s Address to the Legislature: Under Article 176, the Governor addresses the Legislature at the beginning of the first session after elections and the first session of every year.

In States such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Telangana and West Bengal, disputes have occurred when Governors:

• Omitted portions of the speech prepared by the Council of Ministers.
• Added personal observations.
• Walked out before completing the address.
• Refused to read statements critical of the Union government.

Recommendation of President’s Rule: Under Article 356, the President may impose President’s Rule on receiving a report from the Governor or otherwise, if the constitutional machinery of the State has failed.

Governor’s reports have historically been criticised for:

• Being politically motivated.
• Not giving the incumbent government an opportunity to prove majority.
• Relying on subjective assessments.
• Facilitating dismissal of opposition-ruled State governments.

The misuse of Article 356 was substantially restricted by the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994.

History and Rationale Behind the Office of Governor

Government of India Act, 1858: Provincial Governors functioned primarily as agents of the British Crown and exercised extensive administrative authority.

Government of India Act, 1919: The system of dyarchy was introduced in provinces. Governors exercised direct control over “reserved subjects” and possessed overriding powers over elected ministers.

Government of India Act, 1935: Provincial autonomy was introduced, but Governors retained extensive discretionary and special-responsibility powers. They could override ministers in matters relating to peace, minorities, tribal areas and financial stability.

Constituent Assembly: The Constituent Assembly debated whether Governors should be directly elected or appointed. The proposal for elected Governors was rejected because it could:

• Create rivalry between the Governor and Chief Minister.
• Give the Governor an independent political mandate.
• Weaken cabinet responsibility.
• Encourage separatist or provincial tendencies.
• Produce administrative conflict between two elected executives.

The Constitution, therefore, adopted a nominated Governor, appointed by the President but functioning primarily as the constitutional head of the State.

Rationale Behind the Institution

• Constitutional Head of the State: The Governor provides a formal head for the State executive, while actual power is exercised by the elected Council of Ministers.
• Continuity and Stability: The Governor represents the continuing authority of the State regardless of changes in ministries or political majorities.
• Constitutional Guardian: The Governor is expected to ensure that the State government functions according to the Constitution, especially during political instability.
• Link Between the Union and State: The Governor acts as a constitutional communication channel between the Union and State governments, but should not function merely as an agent of the Centre.
• Neutral Arbiter during Political Uncertainty: In situations such as a hung Assembly, loss of majority or breakdown of constitutional machinery, the Governor performs limited discretionary functions.
• Protection of Tribal and Special Areas: Governors have special responsibilities concerning Scheduled Areas under the Fifth Schedule and in certain States under special constitutional provisions such as Articles 371A, 371H and related provisions.

Important Constitutional Provisions Related to the Governor

The constitutional text makes the Governor the formal executive head, but Articles 163 and 164 establish cabinet responsibility as the normal rule.

Issues Related to the Post of Governor in India

Politicisation of Appointment Issue: Article 155 provides for appointment by the President, which in practice means appointment on the advice of the Union Council of Ministers. The State government has no formal constitutional role.

Consequences

• Politically affiliated persons may be appointed.
• Former ministers and party leaders may continue partisan behaviour.
• Opposition-ruled States may distrust the Governor.
• Raj Bhavan may be perceived as an extension of the Union government.

Insecurity of Tenure: Under Article 156, the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President, though the normal tenure is five years.

Governors may be:

• Removed after a change in the Union government.
• Transferred without stated reasons.
• Pressured to act in accordance with the preferences of the Centre.

Supreme Court: In B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, 2010, the Court held that a Governor may be removed without assigning reasons, but removal cannot be arbitrary, capricious or based merely on ideological differences.

Indefinite Delay in Assent to Bills: Article 200 uses the phrase “as soon as possible” for returning a non-Money Bill but does not prescribe a numerical deadline.

A Governor may delay a Bill without formally:

• Assenting to it.
• Returning it.
• Reserving it for the President.

This indirectly defeats State legislation without taking a constitutionally accountable decision.

State legislation examples

• Tamil Nadu Bills changing the system of Vice-Chancellor appointments.
• Kerala University Laws Amendment Bills.
• Chhattisgarh reservation amendment Bills proposing 76% reservation.
• State Bills seeking to replace the Governor as university Chancellor.
• Bills concerning NEET exemption, cooperative societies and agricultural markets.

Current judicial position

The Supreme Court’s November 2025 advisory opinion held that:

• The Governor must choose one of the constitutionally available options.
• Courts cannot create fixed timelines where the Constitution provides none.
• “Deemed assent” is not constitutionally permissible.
• Prolonged inaction can still invite limited judicial directions requiring the Governor to act.

Reservation of Bills for the President: Under Articles 200 and 201, the Governor may reserve a Bill for presidential consideration. Reservation is mandatory where the Bill would seriously derogate from the powers of the High Court. In other situations, it may be discretionary.

• No clear deadline for the President’s decision.
• State legislation may remain pending for years.
• Bills may be reserved without publicly stated constitutional objections.
• The process gives the Union executive an indirect veto over State legislation.

Policy examples

Bills concerning:

• Reservation policies.
• University governance.
• Appointment of Vice-Chancellors.
• State control over public institutions.
• Repugnancy with Union laws on Concurrent List subjects.

Discretion under Article 163: Article 163 does not confer unlimited or general discretionary power. Discretion must be traceable to a constitutional provision or arise from exceptional circumstances.

Governors sometimes claim discretion in matters that normally require ministerial advice, including:

• Summoning the Legislature.
• Approving the Cabinet’s legislative agenda.
• Appointing university authorities.
• Removing Ministers.
• Delivering the Governor’s address.

Excessive discretion can transform a nominal executive into a parallel political authority.

Role in Hung Assemblies: The Constitution does not prescribe a detailed order of preference for inviting a party or coalition to form government.

Possible manipulation: A Governor may:

• Invite the single largest party despite a rival coalition having majority support.
• Provide excessive time to arrange a majority.
• Order an immediate floor test that disadvantages one side.
• Accept or reject letters of support inconsistently.

Misuse of Floor-Test Power: The Governor may order a floor test only when relevant and objective material indicates that the government may have lost majority.

o Example: Maharashtra, 2022: The Supreme Court held in the 2023 Shiv Sena judgment that internal party dissent alone did not provide adequate material for the Governor to conclude that the government had lost the confidence of the House.

Misuse of Article 356: Historically, Governors’ reports were used to dismiss State governments controlled by parties opposed to the Union government.

Examples

• Dismissal of State governments after changes at the Centre.
• Recommendations without conducting floor tests.
• Reliance on political instability rather than constitutional breakdown.

Constitutional safeguard

In S.R. Bommai, 1994, the Supreme Court held that:

• Majority should normally be tested on the Assembly floor.
• The President’s proclamation is subject to judicial review.
• The Assembly should ordinarily not be dissolved before parliamentary approval.
• Article 356 is an exceptional remedy, not a political instrument.

Immunity and Lack of Accountability: Under Article 361, the Governor is not answerable to any court for the exercise of official powers and enjoys certain procedural protections.

Although gubernatorial actions may be judicially reviewed, the Governor cannot ordinarily be personally compelled to appear before a court.

This produces an accountability gap where:

• Reasons for decisions are not disclosed.
• Legislative delays remain unexplained.
• Removal is controlled by the Union.
• The State Legislature has no impeachment mechanism.

Special Powers in Scheduled Areas: Under the Fifth Schedule, the Governor may modify the application of laws to Scheduled Areas and make regulations concerning tribal land and moneylending.

• Special powers are often exercised on ministerial advice rather than through independent tribal consultation.
• Tribal Advisory Council recommendations may be ignored.
• Annual reports to the President may become routine.
• Protective powers may not prevent displacement, mining-related alienation or transfer of tribal land.

Constitutional Reforms Suggested by Committees and Commissions

A. Sarkaria Commission, 1983–1988

Appointment

• Governor should be an eminent person.
• He or she should be from outside the concerned State.
• The appointee should be detached from local politics.
• A person who has recently participated in active politics should ordinarily not be appointed.
• The Chief Minister of the concerned State should be consulted before appointment.
• A politician belonging to the ruling party at the Centre should not ordinarily be appointed in an opposition-ruled State.

Tenure

• The five-year tenure should ordinarily be respected.
• A Governor should not be removed before completion of tenure except for compelling reasons.

Government Formation

The Commission suggested the following order of preference:

1. A pre-poll alliance commanding a majority.
2. The largest single party capable of securing support.
3. A post-poll coalition in which all partners join the government.
4. A post-poll alliance where some parties extend outside support.

Article 356

• President’s Rule must be used only as a last resort.
• The State should ordinarily be warned before action.
• Majority should be tested on the floor of the House.
• The Governor’s report should contain relevant and objective material.
• Every possibility of forming an alternative government should be explored first.

B. National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, 2000–2002

The NCRWC, headed by Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah, recommended:

• Consultation with the Chief Minister before appointing a Governor.
• Appointment of persons of high integrity and public standing.
• Avoidance of active politicians.
• Security of tenure.
• Objective guidelines for government formation and floor tests.
• Limited and constitutionally justified exercise of discretion.
• Governors should not be eligible for further offices under the Union government, except a second term as Governor or election as President or Vice-President.

C. Punchhi Commission, 2007–2010

Appointment Committee

The Commission suggested a more consultative selection process involving:

• Prime Minister.
• Union Home Minister.
• Speaker of the Lok Sabha.
• Chief Minister of the concerned State.
• The Vice-President could also be associated with the process.

Political Neutrality: A prospective Governor should have remained away from active politics, including local politics, for a reasonable cooling-off period.

Fixed Tenure

• Governor should have a stable five-year tenure.
• The doctrine of pleasure should not permit arbitrary removal.
• Removal should follow a fair and constitutionally regulated process.

Impeachment-Like Removal: The Commission suggested that the State Legislature should have a role in the removal process through an impeachment-like mechanism, thereby making the Governor accountable without placing the office entirely under the Centre.

Bills

• Governors should decide Bills within a reasonable period.
• The Commission suggested that a Governor should normally decide a Bill within six months.
• Reservation of Bills for the President should be based on clear constitutional grounds.

Hung Assembly: The Commission supported clear, uniform guidelines for inviting parties to form government, broadly prioritising pre-poll alliances and demonstrable legislative majority.

Localised Emergency: Instead of imposing President’s Rule over an entire State, the Commission suggested considering a localised emergency in situations where constitutional breakdown is confined to a particular area.

D. Administrative Reforms Commission

The Administrative Reforms Commission emphasised that:

• Governors should be persons with experience in public life and administration.
• The office must remain politically neutral.
• Discretionary powers should be guided by conventions and objective standards.
• Governor’s reports under Article 356 should be factual and not partisan.

Reforms Suggested Through Supreme Court Judgments

Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, 1974: The Supreme Court held that the Governor is a formal constitutional head and must normally act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.

S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994

The Court restricted misuse of Article 356 by holding that:

• Majority must normally be tested on the floor of the Assembly.
• President’s Rule is subject to judicial review.
• The Governor’s report must be based on relevant material.
• Secularism and constitutional governance, not partisan considerations, must guide action.

Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, 2006: The dissolution of the Bihar Assembly based on the Governor’s report was declared unconstitutional. The Governor cannot rely on speculation regarding possible defections or unethical political conduct to prevent the formation of a government.

B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, 2010

The Court held that:

• Governors cannot be removed arbitrarily.
• Removal cannot be based merely on ideological incompatibility.
• The President’s pleasure is not absolute or beyond constitutional limitations.

Shivraj Singh Chouhan v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly, 2020: The Court held that the Governor may order a floor test where objective material indicates that the government has lost majority. The power must be exercised to determine legislative confidence, not to resolve internal political disputes.

State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to Governor of Punjab, 2023: The Supreme Court held that the Governor cannot indefinitely obstruct legislative functioning or question the validity of a duly convened Assembly session in a manner that paralyses governance.

State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, April 2025

The Supreme Court held that indefinite inaction on Bills was constitutionally impermissible and initially laid down timelines for gubernatorial action, treating certain repassed Tamil Nadu Bills as assented.

Presidential Reference on Assent to Bills, November 2025

A five-judge Bench subsequently clarified the constitutional position:

• Under Article 200, the Governor may assent, reserve the Bill for the President, or withhold assent by returning a non-Money Bill with comments.
• The Governor is not bound by ministerial advice in exercising functions under Article 200.
• Courts cannot prescribe fixed timelines absent constitutional text.
• Courts cannot create “deemed assent.”
• The merits of the Governor’s decision are generally non-justiciable.
• In cases of prolonged inaction, courts may issue limited directions requiring the Governor to discharge the constitutional function.

Present legal position: There is no judicially imposed universal deadline or deemed assent, but indefinite constitutional paralysis remains impermissible.

Suggested Reforms and Way Forward

• Consultative Appointment Process: Appoint Governors through a collegium involving the Prime Minister, Home Minister and the concerned Chief Minister, as recommended by the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions.
• Respect Fixed Tenure: Ensure the Governor's five-year tenure under Article 156 is ordinarily completed and prevent arbitrary removal, as emphasised in B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010).
• Time-bound Decision on Bills: Prescribe a reasonable statutory or constitutional timeline for Governors to decide on Bills under Article 200 to prevent indefinite delays.
• Codify Discretionary Powers: Clearly define the scope of discretionary powers, especially in matters of government formation, floor tests and reservation of Bills, to minimise misuse.
• Floor Test as Sole Majority Test: Legislative majority should always be determined on the floor of the House, not through subjective assessment by the Governor.
• Restrict Misuse of Article 356: Follow the S.R. Bommai (1994) principles by treating President's Rule as a measure of last resort and relying on objective material.
• Adopt a Code of Conduct: Introduce a formal code requiring Governors to maintain political neutrality, constitutional restraint and cooperative federalism.
• Strengthen Cooperative Federalism: Promote regular consultation and dialogue between the Governor, Chief Minister and the Union to resolve constitutional differences institutionally rather than through litigation.

Conclusion

The office of Governor is neither meant to be a parallel government nor merely an agent of the Union. It is a constitutional institution designed to provide continuity, neutrality and protection during exceptional situations. Its legitimacy depends less on expanding discretionary powers and more on political neutrality, reasoned decision-making, respect for elected governments and faithful adherence to constitutional morality.